I. Introduction
1 This is a revised version of the paper presented at the Paris conference in 1992. It draws heavily on, and extends the analysis of, Singh [1993] .
An outstanding feature of the world financial economy during the last decade or so has been the establishment and the very fast expansion of stock markets in developing countries. Between 1982 and 1992 the total combined capitalisation of companies quoted on the emerging markets included in the IFC list rose from less than hundred billion dollars to nearly a trillion U.S. dollars. The corresponding growth in the combined capitalisation of industrial countries market was a little more than three fold -from three trillion to ten trillon U.S.
dollars.
A number of leading individual emerging markets (e.g. Mexico, Korea, Thailand) recorded more than twenty fold increase in total market capitalisation of companines quoted on the stock exchanges. By the early 1990's capitalisation of many emerging markets, whether considered in absolute terms or as a proportion of GDP, was greater than that of medium sized advanced countries markets in Europe (e.g. Sweden, Denmark and Finland).
It will be recalled that in the General Theory, Keynes was stringent in his criticism of the role of the stockmarket in relation to industrial investment and the real economy. In a famous passage, in chapter 12 he wrote:"As the organisation of investment markets improves, the risk of the predominance of speculation does, however, increase. In one of the greatest investment markets in the world, namely, New York, the influence of speculation (in the above sense, ie. 'the activity of forecasting the psychology of the market')is enormous. ... Speculators may do no harm as bubbles on a steady stream of enterprise. But the position is serious when enterprise becomes the bubble on a whirlpool of speculation. When the capital development of a country becomes a by-product of the activities of a casino, the job is likely to be ill-done."
That was of course yesterday. Today the stockmarkets are the 'toast of the town'. New ones are being established and existing ones being expanded by developing countries around the globe -from the least developed countries like Tanzania and Nepal to, as seen above, the most advanced of the industrilizing economies like Korea and Taiwan. Despite the huge stock market scam in India in 1992, almost every important city in the country, either already has or aspires to have a stock exchange. Interestingly, stock markets are being favoured, not just by the Bretton Woods institutions (as one would expect), but also in heterodox circles.
For example, a WIDER Study Group in Helsinki in its 1990 report strongly recommended the establishment of such markets in poor countries in order to attract portfolio investment funds from rich countries.
More significantly, the communist government in China is fast expanding stock markets. In his Report to the 13th Congress of the Chinese Communist Party in 1988, the then General Secretary of the party Zhao Zhi Yang provided an ideological justification for the use of the stock market by a socialist economy. He suggested that during the `primary state of socialism', and the `commodity production' stages of the development of a socialist economy, it is necessary to use various market forms including the stock market.
Zhao argued that such institutions should not simply be regarded as a preserve of capitalism: socialism should also take advantage of them whilst minimising their harmful effects 2 .
Notwithstanding this almost universal enthusiasm in third world countries for stock markets, it is important to be cautious about the role of these markets in economic development. This is not just because of Keynes' strictures above. More importantly there is very considerable concern today in the US and the UK themselvescountries where stock markets are more advanced and reign supreme -about the negative effects of these markets on these nations' competitiveness vis-a-vis countries like Germany and Japan (where equity markets have historically been far less significant in relation to industrial development). A growing number of economists and industrialists in both the US and the UK believe that stock market -based economies are at a competitive disadvantage in relation to Germany and Japan which have bank based financial systems. Stock markets, it is contended, lead inevitably to short-termism. They tend to become vehicles for short-term gains 2 For a full discussion of the role of the stock market in a socialist economy, see Singh [1990] . In view of these contradictory assessments of the role of the stock market for competitiveness and long term investment and innovation, it is essential for the developing countries before they go too far in this direction to ask how precisely do the stock markets help in the industrialisation process.
Specifically, the following issues need careful investigation.
(a) What are the channels through which the establishment of a stock market fosters economic and industrial development in a country?
3 Porter [1992a, p.65] . This paper reports the findings of a large research project sponsored by the Harvard Business School and the Council on Competitiveness, a project that included 18 research papers by 25 academic experts.) There is a voluminous literature on this subject, but our discussion here will inevitably be brief and concentrate only on the essential points. 6 The stock market may encourage savings in developing countries by providing households with an additional instrument which may better meet their risk preferences and liquidity needs. For a recent revue article on the subject, see Hughes and Singh [1990] . sectors both in the US and the UK was negative over this period.
What this indicates is that corporate new issues in these two countries were more than matched by a net redemption of corporate shares (mainly because of takeovers).
In other industrial countries, although new issues made a net positive contribution to corporate investment over the period considered, it was extremely small and amounted to no more than 2 to 3 per cent of the total.
Mayer's data also indicates that in all countries the main source of corporate finance is `retain earnings'. It is the influence of short termism and speculators on the stock market that had led Keynes in the General Theory to liken the stock market to a gambling casino.
Although "efficient" prices in the fundamental valuation sense are a necessary condition for the stock market to perform its developmental tasks, they are not sufficient. Sufficiency requires in addition, the existence of an `efficient' takeover mechanism which can ensure that all those companies whose profitability under their existing managements was lower than what it could be under any other management, were acquired by the latter.
For large management controlled oligopolistic corporations in capitalist economies, for which the natural selection process on 7
See the contributions to the "Symposium on Bubbles" in the Journal of Economic Perspectives, vol 4(2), 1990.
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See for example Shiller [1981] ; Modigliani and Cohen [1979] ; Poterba and Summers [1988] ; Smith, Suchaneck and Arlington [1988] ; Nickell and Wadhwani [1987] . For a careful recent review of the burgeoning theoretical and empirical literature in this area see Camerer [1989] . the product markets may not work, the takeover mechanism is the only effective marked-based disciplinary device. 9 However, modern theorists of the firm and industrial organisation have argued in recent contributions that for a number of powerful reasons (e.g. the transactions costs, the `free rider' problem), even in principle, the takeover device may not work effectively despite the fact that the pricing process of the stock market were "efficient.
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More significantly, empirical studies of the actual nature of the take-over selection process on the stock market show that contrary to the folklore of capitalism, in general it is not the case that only the unprofitable companies are taken over, or that greater the profitability (or the stock market valuation) of a company, the correspondingly lower its chances of acquisition. Evidence from a wide range of studies for the UK, the US and other industrial countries indicate that the take-over selection takes place only to a very limited degree on the basis of profitability; it does so much more in terms of the size of the company.
A large, relatively unprofitable company has a much greater change of being immune from take over than a much more profitable but a small company. In fact, in the real world stock markets, making an acquisition to increase size might itself become a tactic to avoid take over. (Greer, 1986; Singh, 1971) . There is a large literature on the subject. For a recent review article see Singh [1992] .
If we turn from the question of what kinds of companies are taken over on the stock market and by whom to that of what happens to resource use following takeover, the empirical evidence is no more reassuring. In addition to their disciplinary role, takeovers also provide an important mechanism in a capitalist economy for the reorganisation of the capital resources of the society in response to changing technology, tastes, and market conditions. However a wide range of empirical studies comparing pre -and post merger profitability indicate that, on average, the profitability of merging firms does not improve after merger. To the extent that monopoly power of the acquiring company in the product market may increase as a consequence of takeover, this evidence is compatible with reduced efficiency in resource utilisation following mergers.
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If the post-merger outcome of the amalgamation process is considered in terms of the effect on share prices (rather than on the accounting rates of return), the results of empirical studies suggest that the shareholders of the victims invariably gain as a consequence of takeover (due to the bid premia) whilst those of the acquirers do not. These bid premia on taken over companies are regarded by economists who believe in the `efficiency' of the stock market pricing and takeover processes, as indicators of unrealised long-term efficiency gains. It is however, more natural to think of them as arising from the `dual valuation' situation which exists 11 See Singh [1971, 75, 93] ; Meeks [1977] ; Mueller [1980] . on the stock market in relation to takeovers (Charkham, 1988; Plender, 1990) : one is the normal day-to-day valuation of a small number of a company's shares which may be traded and reflects valuation at the margin; the other is the valuation for the control of the company as a whole when intra-marginal holders have to be bought out (Hughes, 1989) .
The differences between these two valuations provide enormous opportunities for predators, speculators and others who may gain simply putting a `company into play' regardless of the economic and industrial logic of the acquisition.
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To sum up the above analysis suggests that even with well organised and complex stock markets such as those which exist in the US and the UK, the stock market is unable to perform its disciplinary and allocative tasks at all well; nor is it conspicuously successful in promoting savings. However the fact that the stock markets may not confer much benefit on the advanced countries does not mean that their influence is nevertheless generally benign or at least harmless. As noted in Section I, there are good analytical reasons for the view that the active role which the stock markets play in the US and the UK may actually be damaging to these economies.
This theme will be explored in the next section by comparing the characteristics and experience of the Anglo-saxon economies with those of Japan and Germany where the stock market for historical 12 For a fuller discussion of the diffrences between the merger studies based on accouting and share price data see Caves (1989) , Scherer ( ), Singh (1993) . There is also a rather different status for the shareholders and the stock market in general than in the Anglo-Saxon economies.
Both in Japan and West Germany hostile takeovers are virtually absent.
As Mr. Kazuo Nukazawa, a managing director of Keidanren (the Japanese employers federation) explains:
`Ours is not the rugged or brutal capitalism of the eighteenth and nineteenth century. When good management today involves not just production and sales but also integration with the corporate and social environment, a takeover objected to by such "stake-holders" is doomed to fail in the long run. In the Japanese scheme of things, the shareholders are placed a `distant last', behind almost everyone else who has dealings with the company -the so-called stake-holders.
14 The latter include managers, employees, creditors, banks, customers and suppliers and, if the company is a part of a large group, the parent company.
Takeovers cannot be successfully completed without the consent of the significant stake-holders in each case.
In Germany also the incidence of hostile takeovers is very low.
Moreover, the size of the German stock market is relatively small; At the simplest level the argument is that the existence of a highly active market for corporate control, with its hostile take-overs and leveraged buy-outs oblidges the U.S. and the U.K managers to pay close attention to their earnings per share performances every quarter or every six months. This forces them to become "short-termist" in their outlook and to sacrifice long term useful investments at the altar of short term earnings.
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A related point is made in the recent MIT Commission Report on U.S.
industrial productivity (MIT, 1989) , which suggests that U.S.
industries have lost out to the Japanese not because Japanese wages are relatively low, but because the relative cost of capital and the threshold rate of return in Japan are much lower. The
Commission gives examples of a number of American markets where Japanese have come in, accepted a very low rate of return, while the American companies have diversified and left those markets, since they could not accept such low returns. Japanese companies are able to sustain such low rates of return for prolonged periods because they are not subject to the constant take-over threat of the kind which the American firms have to endure.
The Japanese and also the West German financial systems, which are bank rather than stock-market-dominated, are thus on this analysis regarded as being much more conducive to the development of the real economy and to international competitiveness. [1989] . For a fuller discussion of the relationship between takeovers and short-termism see Singh [1993a] . who called attention to the critical role of the banks in initiating and fostering industrial development during the last century in Germany, France and Japan.
Keynes observed in the General Theory: `the spectacle of modern investment markets has sometimes moved me towards the conclusion that to make the purchase of an investment permanent and indissoluble, like marriage, except by reason of death or other great cause, might be a useful remedy for our contemporary evils.
For this would forced the investor to direct his mind to the long term prospects and to those only' (chapter 12). Characteristically Keynes puts his finger on a central analytical weakness of a stock market system with respect to the finance-industry relationship.
An important feature of a stock market is that it provides the individual investor with more or less ready liquidity. This is usually regarded as a virtue by the exponents of the stock market.
As Mr John Tagino, a former head of global equity trading at Merrill Lynch put it in relation to the global equities market for leading corporations: `(it) gives the customer the ability to have instant liquidity at any time of the day or night, he or she wants it'. See further Cosh, Hughes and Singh [1989; Mayer [1988] and Frank and Mayer [1990] .
Apart from all the problems associated with the finance -industry relationships which even well organised stock markets have, most third world stock markets are in their infancy. They tend therefore to be shallow; they do not yet have fully developed systems of regulation, accounting standards, etc.
Although in all these respects, these markets may be expected to improve over time and behave more like advanced country stock markets, research suggests that they currently display certain special characteristics.
These will be briefly taken up in this section.
IV.1 Volatility
Stock market prices tend to fluctuate more than other economic variables even in fully developed markets. However, the high degree of volatility is a negative future of stock markets in that it can undermine the financial system as a whole; it also makes share prices much less useful as a guide to the allocation of resources. Moreover to the extent that they discourage risk-averse possess in sufficient numbers information -gathering and disseminating private firms or public organisations of kind found in developed countries, the share prices in these emerging markets are likely to be dominated by `noise' and speculation. Second, the fact that not many listed companies in these young markets will have a long enough track record, or sufficient time to establish reputations, will tend to produce market volatility and arbitrary prices.
IV.2 New Issues and Equity Financing
It was seen earlier that equity financing makes a very small contribution to the growth of corporations in the advanced countries -because of takeovers, in the US, and the UK, the equity market's net contribution to financing of corporate growth has in fact been negative in recent years. However up to now very little information has been available on the patterns of corporate finance in developing countries. In the first study of its kind, Singh and
Hamid ( It has sometime been suggested that since the developing countries have regulated financial systems, speculation in the stock markets act as release valve that in a free system will be expressed elsewhere. However for all its faults, it is better to allow speculation in gold or real estate than in corporate shares which concern an economy's directly productive potential. Moreover to the extent that it is thought necessary for the government to cater to the tastes of speculators, it is better to provide them with a lottery than a stock market where the underlying assets are nothing less than the country's industrial present and future.
IV.3 Foreign Portfolio Investment
As noted in the introduction, the WIDER Study Group has strongly Thirdly to the extent that institutional investors such as pension funds are public agencies which appears to be the case in many developing countries, the governments could use them to maintain more orderly markets. Fourthly, and importantly, the governments should encourage product market competition to discipline corporations rather than to rely on the stock market for this purpose. If a developing country possesses or is able to establish a German-Japanese type financial system, such discipline would be supplemented by the bank monitoring of corporations. To reduce the negative aspects of the role of the stock market would require a full exploration of the policy areas
